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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs- Case No. 16636 
WILLIAM LUIS FORSYTH, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appeal from conviction of four counts of theft 
by deception, second degree felonies in violation of Utah 
Code Annotated§ 76-6-405 (1953, as amended). 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Defendant was tried by a jury on June 25, 26, and 
27, 1979 before the Honorable George E. Ballif of the Fourth 
Judicial District Court, Provo, Utah County. The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty on the four counts of the 
information on June 27, 1979. The defendant appeals from 
the jury's verdict. (Upon State's motion, Count V of the 
information was dismissed.) 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks affirmance of the convictions 
in the lower court. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant was the founder and president of Great 
Outdoors, Incorporated, (hereafter GOI), a Utah Corporation, 
which had as its purpose the construction of a large spa 
in Orem, at 250 West Center Street. The proposed spa was 
to contain, among other things, a dance floor, archery 
range, swimming pools, and weight lifting rooms. Defendant 
actively solicited investors for the spa project to provide 
needed capital. 
Defendant told investors that for $5,000.00 
investment, they would have an interest in the large spa 
and a life time membership. He further told them that the 
large spa was to be financed through the completion of and 
sale of membership in a smaller spa in Orem, Utah, at 1650 
East South State Street. 
During the solicitations of investors, defendant 
· d · 1 · · · s1· ste"i knowingly ma e several materia misrepresentations, incon .. I 
promises and mutually exclusive claims to investors. 
For example, Benjamin De Hoyos, James Broadbent, 
Wayne Turley, and Ralph Ladle were told by defendant that 
their investment was totally secured by the large spa proper:: 
-2-
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site at 250 West Center Street. De Hoyos testified that 
defendant told him that the land was owned by GOI free and 
clear and was sure collateral for any investments (Tr. 122). 
De Hoyos relied on these representations in making his 
investment (Tr. 103,105). Defendant told Broadbent that 
he (defendant) owned the Center Street property. Broadbent, 
on the basis of this representation, felt secure in his 
investment in the company (Tr. 138,139). Turley was told 
by defendant that the Center Street property was the ace 
in the hole, and that there was enough money wrapped up in 
the property to guarantee the return of any money to 
investors. Turley felt that his investment was a sure 
thing since defendant represented it as being backed up 
with all that land (Tr. 172). Ladle testified that defendant 
represented the Center Street property as being the security 
for Ladle's investment (Tr. 174). 
The evidence., contrary to defendant's representations, 
was that the Center Street property was neither owned free 
and clear, nor did defendant or Great Outdoors, Incorporated 
have sufficient equity in the property to guarantee the 
return of the money of investors. The Center Street property 
was foreclosed on after defendant had paid only $34,000.00 
of the principal owing on the property (Tr. 223,224). 
Despite the more than $182,000.00 received by the defendant 
-3-
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from investors, (Exh. 58). Defendant defaulted on two 
relatively small payments on the property and left 
construction projects on the property unfinished (Tr. 224~ 
228). 
Defendant made representations to prospective 
investors that only $50,000.00 was needed to complete the 
small spa project, that there would be only ten investors 
investing $5,000.00 each, and that the money was to be used 
to finish the smaller spa project. Ivan Park, who invested 
$5,000.00 in GOI as early as May, 1973, testified that at 
that time defendant named "seven or eight, or some such 
number" of investors (Tr. 304). After defendant named 
seven or eight, at least nine people paid monies to defendant, 
Helen Evans invested $12,000.00 in June, 1973 (Tr. 256); 
Ladle invested in September, 1973 (Tr. 273); Brown invested 
in 1973 (Tr. 280-283); Taylor invested in February, 1974 
(Tr. 314,315), as did Brothers (Tr. 346), and the four 
victims. Significantly, the defendant first told the four , 
victims listed in the information - De Hoyos, Uzelac, Turley, 1
1 
and Broadbent - that there were only to be ten investors ata 
total of $5 O, O 00. O O after Park, the "seven or eight" investo::, 
mentioned to Park, Evans, Ladle, Brown Taylor and Brothers 
had invested. (T. r 31, 34, 161, 167, 168) . Defendant even told 
De Hoyos, as late as May, 197 4, that De Hoyos was the seventr.' 
-4- l 
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person to invest (Tr. 100). Defendant's Exhibit 58 revealed 
that, in fact, there were over one hundred investors who 
had invested $182,625.00 in defendant's corporation. (Exh. 
58, p.l, line 26). 
Although defendant told investors GOI only needed 
$50,000.00 the following debts,known by defendant,were proven 
to be owed by GOI prior to May, 1974: 
date debt payable amount to whom payable 
1 January 1974 $20,000 due on the contract on the 
land for the large spa (Tr. 
219-222) 
30 January 1974 $ 5,000 due Wayne Brown (Tr. 287 I 
Exhibit 37 
30 January 1974 $ 5,000 due Ralph Ladle (Tr. 271, 
275, 276, Exhibits 15,16) 
30 January 1974 $ 8,500 due Ivan Park (Tr. 305,306 
Exhibit 451) 
30 January 1974 $13,496 due on large spa (Tr. 226-
228) 
16 April 1974 $12,000 due Helen Evans (Tr. 257-259, 
262, Exhibit 31) 
TOTAL - $63,996 
In addition, defendant knew GOI owed significant sums of 
:, money to sub contractors who had worked on the small spa 
property. Eldon Adams, who leased property to defendant 
for the small spa, gave testimony that he (Adams) paid over 
$34,000 to persons who had done work on the small spa property 
-5-
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while defendant had control of the property under the 
lease (Tr. 359-364). Adams subsequently completed the 
work on the small spa for a total cost of $193,000 (Tr. 
380-381) . 
Defendant represented to many investors, both 
victims in the information and others, that they would 
receive a rapid return on their investment. Park, who 
invested in May, 1973, was promised his money back in a 
maximum of six months (Tr. 302,303). Taylor, who invested 
in February, 1974, was promised that he would be the first 
to get his money back, that his money would be returned 
within three months, and that this offer would not be 
made to anyone else (Tr. 314-319) . Helen Evans, who invested 
in June, 1973, was to have been paid back by the first of 
January, 1974. Defendant promised in writing to pay her 
$3,000.00 in each of the months of May, June, July, and 
August, 1974 (Tr. 262, Exh. 32). Evans never received her 
money back (Tr. 256, 259, 260, 262, 263). De Hoyos was 
promised his money back in four months (Tr. 103). Defendant 
promised Uzelac and Turley their money back in one year's 
time (Tr. 35, 168). Terry was to receive his return of 
investment within three or four months (Tr. 347). The 
victims in the information did not receive their money back. 
Defendant made mutually exclusive representations 
-6-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
concerning enterprises. Defendant told De Hoyos that GOI, 
the company involved with the spas, was the parent Company 
and owner of Build Estate, Incorporated (Tr. 127-129). 
Thorell, who was also investing in the spas, was told by 
the defendant to make his check payable to Build Estate 
(Tr. 311). Defendant told several of the other investors, 
including Thorell and Evans, that they were investing in 
Build Estate, Incorporated,_ the parent company which owned 
GOI and which was to draw income from GOI (Tr. 265, 266, 
311). For prior rulings in this case see State v. Forsyth, 
560 P.2d 337 (Utah 1977); and State v. Forsyth, 587 P.2d 
1387 (Utah 1978). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
TESTIMONY OF INVESTORS OTHER THAN THOSE 
VICTIMS LISTED IN THE INFORMATION WAS 
PROPERLY ADMITTED UNDER RULE 55 OF THE 
UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE TO DEMONSTRATE 
DEFENDANT'S INTENT, PREPARATION, PLA.~, 
KNOWLEDGE, SCHEME OF OPERATIONS, AND 
ABSENCE OF MISTAKE. 
Although evidence of crimes committed by the 
defendant other than those covered in the immediate prosecution 
is generally inadmissible, Utah rules and legal precedent 
specifically allow certain logical and reasonable exceptions. 
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence, provides: 
Su~ject to Rule 47, evidence that 
a person committed a crime or civil 
wrong on a specific occasion, is 
inadmissible to prove his disposition 
to commit crime or civil wrong as the 
basis for an inference that he 
committed another crime or civil wrong 
-7-
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on another specified occasion but, 
subject to Rule 45 and 48, such evidence 
is admissible when relevant to prove 
some other material fact including absence 
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, 
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge or 
identity. 
(Emphasis added.) See also State v. Schieving, 535 P.2d 1232 
(Utah 1975). 
This general principle of evidence was explained by 
the court in State v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2d 257, 451 P.2d 772 
(1969): 
Concededly, evidence of other crimes 
is not admissible if the purpose is to 
disgrace the defendant as a person of evil 
character with a propensity to commit crime 
and thus likely to have committed the crime 
charged. However, if the evidence has 
relevancy to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime, it is 
admissible for that purpose; and the fact 
that it may tend to connect the defendant 
with another crime will not render it 
incompetent. 
451 P.2d at 775. 
Rule 55, Utah Rules of Evidence allows evidence 
of other crimes or civil wrongs to show not only "absence 
of mistake or accident, motive intent .. plan, 
knowledge," but to prove "some other material fact .. 
Thus, other crimes may be used to show anything which 
has a legitimate evidentiary purpose other than merely 
to discredit the defendant. The following Utah 
criminal cases are illustrative of the types of 
-8-
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evidence which may be properly admitted under Rule 55: 
State v. Schieving, supra, evidence of heavy 
indebtedness and two garnishments admitted to show motive 
and intent for embezzlement. 
State v. Cauble, 563 P.2d 775 (Utah 1977), 
evidence of other sales proceeds having been taken by 
appellant was admissible to establish a common plan or a 
scheme and to show a motive. 
State v. Baran, 25 Utah 2d 16 (1970), evidence 
of several other crimes committed by the defendant on an 
evening spree admitted to "explain the circumstances 
surrounding the instant crime." Id. at 19. 
State v. Mason, 530 P.2d 795 (Utah 1977), 
defendant's use of heroin on the day in question admissible 
to determine her mental condition at the time she testifies, 
even though the charge is for theft. 
State v. Lopez, supra, property taken from 
defendant's car which came from an unrelated crime admitted 
"to explain the circumstances surrounding the instant crime." 
Id. at 260. 
State v. Kasai, 27 Utah 2d 321, 495 P.2d 1265 
(1972), prior drug· contacts shown to explain the circumstances 
surrounding the crime and to show a state of mind of the 
-9-
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defendant. 
State v. Maestas, 560 P.2d 343 (Utah 1977), 
evidence of a robbery committed a few days before the 
homicide admissible to show the motive for the homicide, 
and intent on the part of the defendant. 
State v. Neal, 254 P.2d 1053 (Utah 1953), 
four robberies in California for which the defendant was 
not convicted admissible to establish that the defendant 
was facing a series of prosecutions in Utah and California 
and thereby supplied a strong motive for trying to shoot his 
way to freedom. 
State v. VanDyke, 589 P.2d 764 (Utah 1978), 
evidence of the defendant's robbing several other smaller 
places admissible to show preparation and plan. 
State v. Sharp, No. 15915 (Utah, April 2, 1979), 
evidence of entry into other cabins admissible to show pl~ , 
and the activities of the defendant concerning the crime 
charged. 
State v. Daniels, No. 15509 (Utah, Sept. 13, 1978), 
evidence that the defendant stole gasoline was relevant to 
explain the circumstances surrounding the crime for which 
he was charged. 
State v. Brown, 577 P.2d 135 (Utah 1978), evidence 
of theft of an automobile, sale of a stolen automobile, and 
-10-
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an attempt to conceal the crimes by placing parts in a 
wrecked automobile was admissible on a separate charge to 
show intent and knowledge and also to reveal a modus operandi. 
See also State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 (Utah 1978); 
State v. Mitchell, 571 P.2d 1351 (Utah 1977); State v. Boone, 
581 P.2d 405 (Utah 1978). 
Defendant says the testimony of the investors other 
than the victims was improperly admitted. Respondent asserts 
that the testimony of the other investors reveals substantial 
relevant misrepresentations made by the defendant in perpetration 
of a common plan or scheme, completes the picture of the 
entire investment scheme rather than just the relatively small 
part played by the victims, and shows the entire circumstances 
under which the defendant was operating at the time he spoke 
to the victims. See Facts, supra. 
Late in the scheme, defendant asserted that no more 
than ten investors would be allowed to participate, at $5,000.00 
each. The testimony of victims other than those named in the 
information showed more than ten investors had already 
participated. Specifically, Parks was told by defendant of 
seven or eight investors at the time he invested, in May, 
1973 (Tr. 304). After Park was told that there were already 
seven or eight other investors, additional persons invested 
in the corporation, including Evans, Ladle, Brown, Taylor, 
-11-
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and Brothers. After that, the defendant represented to the 
victims, De Hoyos, Uzelac, Turley, and Broadbent, that 
there were only to be ten partnerships in total. 
Although in April, 1974, defendant and GO! owed 
$63,996.00--on the large spa property, to investors, and for 
i 
work done on the large spa property--and an additional $34,00u.I 
for work done on the small spa property, and although $193,00u. 
was needed to complete the small spa, defendant maintained, 
as late as May, 1974, that only $50,000.00 was necessary to 
complete the small spa project, that the small spa would pay 
for the large spa completely, and that there were, at that 
time, seven out of ten investors who had invested their 
money. $50,000.00 would not have even paid the current, 
known obligations of GOI, let alone result in completion of 
the small spa and the large spa. 
Testimony of other investors showed that defendant 
misrepresented the ownership of the large spa property at 
250 West Center Street in Orem to victims and other investors, 
alike, telling them that he owned the property free and 
clear and held it as collateral to pay investors, and that 
enough money was wrapped up in the property to guarantee 
the return of any and all investments. Later testimony 
established that the defendant did not own the property 
free and clear, nor did he have sufficient equity to 
-12-
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guarantee the return of investments. The testimony of 
other investors better showed the amounts of equity in 
the property which would have been necessary, but which 
was not available, to collateralize investor and victim's 
moneys. 
Testimony of other investors revealed that defendant 
promised investors a rapid return of their investment, and 
that he made conflicting representations as to who would 
get his money back first. Park, who invested in May, 1973, 
was to get his money back in six months from the time of 
investment, yet defendant promised Taylor, who invested in 
February, 1974, that Taylor was to be the first to get his 
money back. At that time, in February, 1974, defendant 
already owed substantial sums of money to Park, Ladle, and 
Brown (see chart of defendant's debts, p. 5, supra). Yet 
defendant continued to make representations to both victims 
and other investors alike that they would receive a rapid 
return on their investment. 
Evidence of investments by investors other than 
the victims listed in the information showed that defendant 
misrepresented the appropriate business of the company. He 
told some investors that Build Estate, Incorporated was the 
parent company of GOI, that Build Estate owned the spas and 
would receive a portion of anything that GOI made. However, 
De Hoyos and Broadbent, two of the named victims, were told 
that GOI was the parent company. See Facts. 
Defendant did not pay for the work on the small spa 
with the investment of victims and other investors as he 
-13-
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. •· 
represented that he would. He did not own the large spa 
property outright, nor did he own equity in it sufficient 
to guarantee the return of the money to the victims, let 
alone other investors . 
In State v. Schieving, supra, (which appellant 
mis-cites as Olson v. Swapp, 535 P.2d 1233 (Utah 1975)), 
this Court set the standard for receiving evidence of 
a common plan or scheme: 
• • • evidence of another crime is 
admissible . . • to show a common 
scheme or plan embracing commission 
of similar crimes so related to each 
other that the proof of one tends to 
establish the crime for which the 
defendant is on trial. 535 P.2d at 
1233. 
The testimony of investors other than the victims 
named in the information did meet this Court's standard. 
Such testimony corroborated the testimony of the victims 
in great detail, and the combined testimony of victims 
and other investors showed the modus operandi of the defendan: 
I 
The common scheme of the defendant was to make people believe I 
that there were only two or three openings left for investors,! 
take as much money from as many people as possible, ostensibly 
to invest in a small spa, expenses for which were not paid. 
To that end, defendant made many significant representations 
to both the victims and other investors, all of which are 
extremely relevant. The fact that he made similar and 
-14-
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sometimes exactly the same false statements to other 
investors as well as to the victims helps to establish 
that proof of a common scheme necessary for a proper 
determination by the jury. 
In State v. Tuggle, 28 Utah 2d 284, 501 P.2d 
636 (1972), this Court pointed out that "ordinarily the 
admissibility of evidence is for the trial court, and in 
the absence of an abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court, the ruling will not be disturbed on appeal." 
(Id. at 637). This Court has further noted, in State v. 
Lopez, supra, that "such harm as there may be in receiving 
evidence concerning another crime is to be weighed against 
the necessity of full inquiry into the facts relating to 
the issues." (451 P.2d at 775). 
In the present case the trial judge exercised 
sound discretion in admitting the evidence of investors 
other than the victims. He was given ample opportunity 
to weigh and consider the probative value of the evidence, 
and he allowed it in. Clearly, in his view, the importance 
of the evidence in explaining the situation and putting 
the entire matter ·before the jury outweighed any prejudicial 
effect it may have had upon the jury. In the absence of any 
clear showing of an abuse of discretion, the trial judge's 
-15-
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ruling on this matter should stand. 
It is questionable whether or not the evidence of 
other investors even fits the category of other crimes or 
other civil wrongs according to defendant's theory of the 
case. The defendant's defense was that he was engaged in 
a normal business operation which attempted to succeed but 
which legitimately failed. Defendant argues the legitimacy 
of a business on one hand and at the same time alleges that 
evidence of that business is not admissible because it was 
a crime. Representations, conversations, and transactions 
in defendant's declared legitimate attempt at business 
cannot be simultaneously a crime. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence claimed by defendant to be erroneously 
admitted was not admitted for the purpose of demonstrating 
the accused's evil nature or character, or his propensity to 
. 
comrni t a crime, but was admitted for the permissible purpose 
of explaining the circumstances surrounding the crime in 
order to deI!lonstrate intent, preparation, plan and common 
scheme of operation. These are legitimate reasons for the 
introduction of the evidence and the fact that the evidence 
tends to show that the appellant had cornrni tted other crimes 
-16-
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does not render the evidence incompetent. 
For these reasons, the State urges this Court 
to uphold the verdict of the lower court. 
Respectfully submitted this 27th day of 
January, 1981. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
ROBERT R. WALLACE 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
This is to certify that I mailed two copies of 
the foregoing Brief of Respondent to Mr. Stephen R. Madsen, 
Attorney for Appellant, 381 West 2230 North, Suite 201, 
Provo, Utah 84601, this 27th day of January, 1981. 
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